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LIMITING CORPORATE DIRECTORS' LIABILITY:
DELAWARE'S SECTION 102(b)(7) AND
THE EROSION OF THE DIRECTORS' DUTY OF CARE
THOMAS C. LEEt
INTRODUCTION
The corporate directors' duty of care' ideally plays a crucial role
in corporate management. From the shareholders' perspective, that
duty theoretically represents an emblem of their ownership of, and ulti-
mate control over, the corporation. It aids shareholders in monitoring
those who manage the corporation for the shareholders' benefit, while
also allowing the courts to scrutinize unreasonable managerial behav-
ior. In reality, however, such an idealistic perspective is naive as the
duty of care has, in fact, led a "twilight existence."2 Indeed, many have
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1 The duty of care is phrased most often in terms of negligence:
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties
as a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AuT § 8.30(a) (1984) [hereinafter MODEL Am'];
see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1977) ("with such care, including reasona-
ble inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances"); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1986) ("with that degree of
care which an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-33 (1985) ("with such care as an ordinarily
prudent person in like position would use under the circumstances").
2 Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between
Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 789, 796 (1984). For recent discus-
sions of the duty of care, see generally Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care:
Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment
Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983) (providing a general discussion of duty of care
litigation and analyzing the general judicial hesitation in finding breaches of such
duty); Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972
DUKE L.J. 895 (analyzing the behavior of directors as influenced by the existence of
directors' liability rules); Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the De-
rivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL
L. REV. 261 (1986) (discussing proposals which seek to expand the duties of care and
loyalty and analyzing the role liability rules play in assuring contractual performance
in publicly-held corporations); Goldstein, The Relationship Between the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act and the Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Rec-
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argued that the duty of care has been a doctrine whose bark is worse
than its bite, as evidenced by the very few cases finding liability solely
on negligence grounds.'
Recently, a reawakening of the duty of care has broken the rela-
tive tranquility of corporate America. That awakening has brought
about what many have called a "crisis," real or imagined. 4 The talk of
crisis has been sparked by recent well-publicized cases finding directors
in breach of their duty of care,5 and by a concurrent violent swing in
ommendations, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 501 (1984) (discussing sections of various
model acts, as well as other provisions relating to the duty of care); Hinsey, Business
Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: The
Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609 (1984) (discussing
the duty of care in relation to the business judgment rule); Kennedy, The Standard of
Responsibility for Directors, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 624 (1984) (analyzing the duty
of care as provided for in the corporate governance project of the American Law Insti-
tute); Scott, The Role of Preconceptions in Policy Analysis in Law: A Response to
Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 299 (1986) (emphasizing the distinction
between the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the fiduciary duty of care in the context of
corporate governance); Special Project: Director and Officer Liability, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 599 (1987) [hereinafter Special Project] (providing a thorough analysis of current
developments involving the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the business judgment
rule, as well as a discussion of the current crisis in directors' and officers' liability
insurance).
' Commentators have pointed out the paucity of cases in which a director's negli-
gent actions, uncomplicated by any showings of bad faith or self-dealing, formed the
basis of a finding of personal liability. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 140 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that "reported cases in which
liability has in" fact been imposed are remarkably few and generally have involved in-
stances in which corporate officials were suspiciously inattentive to an impending disas-
ter that the court believed would have been obvious to a minimally attentive person");
Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corpo-
rate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1100 (1968) (commenting that, of the
cases finding liability, "none . . . carries real conviction"); Cohn, supra note 2, at 593
(discussing the judicial reluctance to apply negligence standards against well-inten-
tioned directors and officers not motivated by self-enrichment); Kennedy, supra note 2,
at 631 (stating thait "it has been commonplace that most decisions in which directors
have been held liable on due-care grounds also involved either dishonesty or egregious
inattention"). Commentators often have cited the business judgment rule, coupled with
extreme judicial hesitance in granting large damage awards for unreasonable, but
"honest," errors of judgment, as the cause for the scarcity of cases finding breach of
duty of care liability. See Cohn, supra note 2, at 593-95. Other commentators have
cited additional reasons, such as the role of settlements. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2,
at 796.
" See, e.g., Comment, Statutory Limitations on Directors' Liability in Delaware:
A New Look at Conflicts of Interest and the Business Judgment Rule, 24 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 527, 529 (1986) (noting that the stated purpose of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986) is "to help alleviate the perceived crisis in the availability of
liability insurance for directors"); see also Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK.,
Sept. 8, 1986, at 56 (noting the unpopularity of directorships and outlining the
problems that are causing directors to step down).
' See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Francis v. United Jersey
Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981). For a discussion of these three cases, see infra
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the insurance markets making directors' and officers' liability insurance
("D&O insurance") painfully expensive or simply unavailable.' Many
qualified directors, fearing potentially devastating personal loss7 in ex-
change for "modest" directorship fees,8 have fled corporate boardrooms
in search of greener and safer pastures. Especially quick to flee have
been outside directors' who do not have as much at stake in the com-
pany as do inside directors. These developments, in turn, have sent lob-
byists scurrying to state legislative bodies seeking statutory remedies for
their woes. The legislative acquiescence to the cries of corporate lobby-
ists is the focus of this Comment.
Delaware, for example, has recently added a new provision to its
corporations code enabling corporations to insert in their certificates of
incorporation a provision limiting or eliminating 0 directors' liability
for breach of their duty of care.11 Other states have followed suit and
notes 30-65 and accompanying text.
I See Baum, supra note 4, at 56; Hinsey, Directors' and Officers' Insurance: A
Status Report, 18-2 INST. ON SEc. REG. 179 (1986) (comparing D&O insurance mar-
ket for September 1984 and September 1986); Lewin, Director Insurance Drying Up,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at DI, col. 2; Business Struggling to Adapt as Insurance
Crisis Spreads, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 31; Hertzberg, Insurers Beginning to
Refuse Coverage on Directors, Officers in Takeover Cases, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1986,
at 3, col. 2; Hilder, Risky Business: Liability Insurance Is Difficult to Find Now for
Directors, Officers, Wall St. J., July 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
See Special Project, supra note 2, at 601-03 (noting that the increase in litiga-
tion involving directors has led to unprecedented damage awards and high costs).
s Directorship fees can range anywhere from zero to handsome five-figure sums,
along with a variety of perquisites and options. As an example, in 1986, Allied-Signal
offered a flat fee of $45,000 a year, two personal insurance policies, lifetime retirement
benefits, and a one-time grant of 1,500 shares. Some well-known "professional direc-
tors" have been known to earn six-figure directorship-related incomes. See Baum,
"Professional" Directors: So Many Boards, So Little Time, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986,
at 59.
9 An outside director generally is defined as "one who is neither an officer nor an
employee of the corporation . . . . There are some exceptions where, because of special
knowledge or experience, a person should not be classified as an outside director ..
Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639, 652 (Iowa 1979).
10 For the sake of convenience, this Comment will refer to these provisions as
either "liability-limiting" or "liability-eliminating" provisions. These labels are inter-
changeable and should not be construed to cloud the fact that this Comment is dealing
with an enabling provision which allows either liability limitation or elimination.
11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986) provides:
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorpora-
tion may also contain any or all of the following matters:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages
for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provi-
sion shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For
any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which
1987]
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enacted similar provisions. 2 Still others have chosen a different solu-
tion: a lower standard of conduct for directors and officers."3 The
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii)
under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit. No such provision
shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any act or
omission occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes
effective. All references in this paragraph to a director shall also be
deemed to refer to a member of the governing body of a corporation
which is not authorized to issue capital stock.
For a comprehensive analysis of the new Delaware law, see generally Veasey,
Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Lim-
ited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399, 401 (1987) (stating
that the Delaware legislature has created "a three-legged stool of director support: im-
plementation of the new legislation limiting director liability, broad indemnification
rights (within allowable limits), and a comprehensive plan of insurance (if available)").
12 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8634 (Purdon Supp. 1987); Act effective
April 12, 1987, ch. 129, 1987 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 300 (West); Act approved Apr. 14,
1987, ch. 958, 1987 Ark. Legis. Serv. 3096 (Michie); Act approved Jan. 30, 1987, ch.
88, 1987 Kan. Sess. Laws 533; Act approved Feb. 27, 1987, ch. 1, 1987 Mich. Legis.
Serv. 1 (West); Act approved Feb. 4, 1987, ch. 35, 1987 N.J. Legis. Serv. 171 (West);
Act approved July 23, 1987, ch. 367, 1987 N.Y. Legis. Serv. 631 (McKinney).
1s See FLA. STAT. § 607.1645 (1987), reprinted in 3 Corp. Statutes (P-H) 53
(1987) (emphasis added):
(1) A director is not personally liable for monetary damages to the corpo-
ration or any other person for any statement, vote, decision, or failure to
act, regarding corporate management or policy, by a director, unless:
(a) The director breached or failed to perform his duties as a director;
and
(b) The director's breach of, or failure to perform, those duties
constitutes:
4. In a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation to pro-
cure a judgment in its favor or by or in the right of a shareholder, con-
scious disregard for the best interest of the corporation, or willful miscon-
duct;. ...
IND. CODE. ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added) provides:
(a) A director shall, based on the facts then known to the director, dis-
charge the duties as a director, including the director's duties as a member
of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation.
(e) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure
to take any action, unless:
(1) the director has breached or failed to perform the duties of the
director's office in compliance with this section; and
(2) the breach or failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or
recklessness.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (1985) (emphasis added) provides: "A director shall
discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a committee, in
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American Law Institute ("ALI") has deliberated on this matter and
has proposed a novel solution: limiting the liability of directors to "an
amount that is not disproportionate to the economic benefits to the de-
fendant for serving the corporation." 4
This Comment will focus on the advisability of enabling provisions
such as that enacted by Delaware. Part I analyzes the recent develop-
ments in duty of care jurisprudence, the D&O insurance market, and
the composition of the boards of corporate America. Part II examines
the compensatory and deterrent rationales underlying the duty of care
doctrine and concludes that this doctrine serves an important, albeit
limited, function in corporate governance. Part III explores the short-
comings of the Delaware-type provisions and contrasts them with alter-
native approaches. This Comment then concludes by arguing that the
accordance with his good faith business judgment of the best interests of the
corporation."
14 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.17 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1986) [hereinafter
ALI DRAFT No. 6] (emphasis added) provides in pertinent part:
(a) If a failure by a director. . . or an officer. . . to meet the standard of
conduct specified in § 4.01 did not
(1) involve a knowing and culpable violation of law; or
(2) enable the defendant, or an associate . . ., to receive an improper
benefit to which the defendant, or such associate, was not entitled under
Part V; or
(3) show a conscious disregard for the defendant's duty to the corpo-
ration under circumstances that threatened serious injury to the corpora-
tion; or
(4) constitute a sustained and unexcused pattern of inattention that
amounted to an abdication of the defendant's duty to the corporation,
damages for the violation should be limited to an amount that is not
disproportionate to the economic benefits to the defendant for serving the
corporation.
(b) A limitation on damages complying with § 7.17(a) should be effective
if implemented by:
(1) an enabling statute that authorizes the inclusion of a limitation on
damages in a corporation's certificate of incorporation; or
(2) a provision in a certificate of incorporation that is adopted by a
vote of disinterested shareholders . . . after appropriate disclosure con-
cerning the provision; or
(3) judicial decision, if the court finds that in the circumstances justice
so requires because the damages would otherwise be disproportionate
under § 7.17(a).
(c) Any limitation on damages set forth in the corporation's certificate of
incorporation should
(1) require renewal by shareholder vote at periodic intervals and, in
the case of a provision not expressly authorized by statute, by annual dis-
interested shareholder vote; and
(2) not reduce liability with respect to pending actions, or losses in-
curred prior to its adoption, unless a contrary legislative intent plainly
appears.
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Delaware-type legislation is an inappropriate response to the corporate
director "crisis," a quick fix solution that may have deleterious effects
on corporate governance. Additionally, this Comment offers a proposal
for a more tempered solution, one that does not enable the corporation
to totally eliminate directors' liability for breach of their duty of care.
I. THE DUTY OF CARE MELEE
The debate surrounding the duty of care has been especially
heated in recent years. In order to understand this controversy, it is
necessary first to review briefly the subdued history of the duty, then to
examine the developments in three areas that are the focal points of the
duty of care melee: 1) the recent cases seemingly putting some "bite"
back into the duty; 2) the recent D&O insurance crisis; and 3) the
resulting flight and refusals to serve by directors.
A. A Brief History of the Duty of Care
In an oft-cited article, Professor Bishop wrote that "[t]he search
for cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been held
liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is
a search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack."' 5
Up to that point (May 1968), he had found only four such cases." A
more recent count (December 1983) brought the total to seven." By
any reckoning, reported cases holding directors liable for purely "hon-
est mistakes" are rare indeed."
One reason for the duty of care doctrine's twilight existence is that
its greatest strength is also its greatest weakness: the enormous coverage
of its negligence standard. The fact that the number of matters it con-
ceivably might address is indefinitely large has forced courts to eschew
its application and to confront the plaintiff with imposing legal hurdles.
1" Bishop, supra note 3, at 1099.
16 Id. at 1099-1100 (citing New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau v. Weiss,
305 N.Y. 1, 110 N.E.2d 397 (1953); Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse,
51 Misc. 2d 188, 273 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc. 136,
73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 423 Pa. 563,
224 A.2d 634 (1966)).
17 Cohn, supra note 2, at 591 nn.1-2. The additional cases are DePinto v. Provi-
dent Sec. Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967); Heit
v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119
(Del. Ch. 1971). The cases discussed infra notes 30-63 and accompanying text may be
further additions to this list.
18 One can debate, of course, whether even these cases truly are "uncomplicated
by self-dealing," either as a factual matter or as a general proposition that due to
structural biases in the director selection process, one can never be confident that direc-
tors act with absolute altruism. See R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.2.1 (1986).
[Vol. 136:239
LIMITING DIRECTORS' LIABILITY
For example, this judicial apprehension is evident in the common law
evolution of the corporate directors' standard of care. At first, that stan-
dard required a rigorous "degree of care and prudence that men
prompted by self-interest generally exercise in their own affairs."9 A
more subjective, situation-specific standard of "an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position . . . under similar circumstances" now gen-
erally prevails, 0 while Delaware courts have enunciated an ominous
standard of "gross negligence."21
Another manifestation of this judicial avoidance is the liberal ap-
plication of the business judgment rule.2" It is well-noted that judges
' Hun v. Gary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880) (emphasis added). For a sampling of older
cases, see Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 503 (1857); Gubbins v. Bank of Com-
merce, 79 Ill. App. 150 (1898); Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38
N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), affd, 267 A.D. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944); Scott v.
De Peyster, I Edw. Ch. 513 (N.Y. Ch. 1832); Marshall v. Farmers' & Mechanics'
Say. Bank, 85 Va. 676, 8 S.E. 586 (1889). As of 1985, the American Law Institute
identified four states where this standard still prevailed: Alabama, Mississippi, Ne-
braska, and Utah. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 reporter's note (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985) [hereinafter
"ALI DRAFT No. 4"]. It should be noted that some earlier case law involving bank
directors, such as Hun v. Gary, held such directors to a higher standard of care than
directors of ordinary corporations. See W. GARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES & MATERI-
ALS ON CORPORATIONS 523 (5th ed. 1980).
20 MODEl. Amn, supra note 1, § 8.30 (emphasis added). Cases espousing similar
standards include Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); McLeod v. Lewis-Clark Hotel Co., 66 Idaho 584, 164 P.2d 195
.(1945); FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979).
2 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). This is not meant to suggest that the historical move-
ment to a lower standard of conduct required of directors was so clear-cut or uniform
among various jurisdictions. A cursory review of the Decennial Digests, however,
should make this evolution readily apparent. One hardly sees cases applying the "in his
own affairs" standard nowadays, just as one hardly sees any earlier cases applying the
"in a like position under similar circumstances" standard.
2 For a codification of the business judgment rule, see ALl DRAFT No. 4, supra
note 19, § 4.01(c), which provides:
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith
fulfills his duty under this Section if:
(1) he is not interested . .. in the subject of his business judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment
to the extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circum-
stances; and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best
interests of the corporation.
For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see generally R. CLARK, supra note 18,
§ 3.4 (discussing the business judgment rule and how it relates to the duty of care); H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 242 (3d ed. 1983) (defining the
business judgment rule as a rule which "sustains corporate transactions and immunizes
management from liability where the transaction is within the powers of the corpora-
tion (intra vires) and the authority of management, and involves the exercise of due
care and compliance with applicable fiduciary duties"); Hinsey, supra note 2, at 602
(analyzing the treatment of the business judgment rule in the standards set forth by the
19871
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are very reluctant to interfere with the business judgments of direc-
tors. 3 An example of this judicial distaste for "hindsight" adjudication
of good faith business decisions is Kamin v. American Express Com-
pany. 4 In Kamin, the defendant company had made a disastrous in-
vestment in another company, which could have resulted in a capital
loss of $25 million had the shares in the target company been sold on
the open market. Such a sale, however, would have resulted in an $8
million tax savings. Instead, the board of directors declared a "special
dividend" pursuant to which the shares in the target company would be
distributed in kind. 25 The plaintiff shareholders challenged this distri-
bution. The court, however, declared that "[t]he directors' room rather
than the courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out purely
business questions ... .
The Kamin decision is illustrative of the extreme judicial tolerance
of "heat of the moment" good faith business decisions. Further, it
shows the extent to which the business judgment rule has virtually en-
ALI).
23 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 19, at 552 (citing Miller v.
AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 423 Pa.
563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979)).
24 86 Misc. 2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 54 A.D.2d 654, 387
N.Y.S.2d 993 (1976).
25 Id. at 811, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 809-810.
26 Id. at 812-13, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11. Moreover, the court bent over back-
wards to lend legitimacy to the directors' decision at issue by stating:
[The directors] concluded that there were countervailing considerations
primarily with respect to the adverse effect such a sale, realizing a loss of
$25,000,000, would have on the net income figures in the American Ex-
press financial statement. Such a reduction of net income would have a
serious effect on the market value of the publicly traded American Ex-
press stock.
Id. at 814, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811 (emphasis added). In other words, the directors may
make an adverse financial decision, in Kamin the foregoing of an $8 million tax sav-
ings, to "save face" in the open market.
One can certainly understand why the directors of a high-profile financial com-
pany would not want to proclaim in the open market that they had made a terrible
investment decision. But the court's "serious effect on the market value" line of reason-
ing is susceptible to the "slippery slope" argument. For example, could a court excuse
the nondisclosure of management fraud because that would adversely effect the com-
pany's stock prices? Of course, the Kamin court would not have gone that far.
The Kamin decision was wrongly decided because the court did not allow a full
development of the facts as to whether a business decision had in fact been made (i.e. a
decision comparing the foregone tax savings with the possible decline in the value of the
company stocks) before invoking the business judgment rule. The court does intimate,
however, that the plaintiffs' objections to the "special dividend" were "carefully consid-
ered" by the board of directors, id. at 813, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811, but this is insufficient




gulfed the duty of care doctrine. Commentators, in turn, either have
mourned the duty of care in light of these developments, 27 or have ar-
gued to bury it once and for all.28 Then came a recent set of cases, the
most prominent of which is Smith v. Van Gorkom,29 which added more
fuel to the fire in this duty of care melee.
B. Reawakening the Sleeping Giant:
Recent Vigorous Application of the Duty of Care
Three prominent cases have allegedly reawakened the great, some
may say frightening, potential of the duty of care: Francis v. United
Jersey Bank,30 Smith v. Van Gorkom (the Trans Union case), and
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc."1 These cases sent
shock waves not only through the boardrooms of corporate America,
but also through the halls of state legislatures.32 A close examination of
these cases, however, reveals that such lobbying efforts were neither
imperative nor appropriate.
In Francis, the New Jersey Supreme Court condemned one form
of a director's breach of duty that has always met with the strongest
judicial disapproval: directorial inactivity. 3 Francis provided the New
27 See Cohn, supra note 2, at 595; Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Mar-
ket as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedure, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 745, 758-
63 (1984).
2 See Scott, Corporate Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Govern-
ance Project, 35 STAN. L. REv. 927, 935-37 (1983). For an evaluation of the opposing
views, see Coffee, supra note 2.
19 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
30 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
31 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
2 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986) (reproduced supra note
11). Most notably, Gilchrist Sparks III, the chairman of the Corporate Law Section of
the Delaware Bar Association which drafted section 102(b)(7), explicitly cited Trans
Union as one major reason for the adoption of the provision. See Sparks III, Dela-
ware's D&O Liability Law: Other States Should Follow Suit, Legal Times, Aug. 18,
1986, at 10, col. 1.
22 See generally R. CLARK, supra note 18, § 3.4.1 (stating that the most common
violation of the directorial duty of care is inactivity; that is, the "simple failure . . . to
engage in the basic activities of [a director]"). As will be more fully developed, see infra
text accompanying notes 189-215, the Delaware liability-limiting provision would ei-
ther tolerate such socially undesirable behavior or would force the litigant to
re.characterize what has always been regarded as an act in breach of the duty of care as
one of the enumerated exceptions in the Delaware provision. See supra note 11. The
court would most likely require the plaintiff to prove that the inactivity constituted an
omission not in good faith or involved intentional misconduct. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (Supp. 1986). Forced to take the latter route, the plaintiff would
most likely have a more difficult case to prove. See R. CLARK, supra note 18, § 3.4.1
(discussing the evidentiary difficulties inherent in a breach of fiduciary duty suit not
based upon a negligence standard).
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Jersey Supreme Court with a fascinating fact pattern 4 as a vehicle for
its pronouncement. Plaintiffs were not shareholders, as is typical in
such an action, but trustees in bankruptcy; the defendant was the exec-
utrix of a deceased director's estate.35 The case involved a close corpo-
ration with three shareholder-directors.36 The deceased director, the
widow of the company founder, had been a physically incapacitated,
grief-stricken alcoholic who "was not active . . .and knew virtually
nothing of [the] corporate affairs. '3 7 The court found the estate liable
for the deceased director's negligent failure to attempt to forestall a
massive fraud perpetrated by the remaining two directors, her sons, and
awarded damages of over $10 million. 8 The court's ruling made it
forcefully clear that "[a] director is not an ornament, but an essential
component of corporate governance. Consequently, a director cannot
protect himself behind a paper shield bearing the motto 'dummy
director.' ""
Trans Union struck closer to the heart of mainstream corporate
boards and immediately prompted an uproar.40 Prior to the challenged
transaction, the Trans Union Corporation appeared to have an "ideal"
board of directors: five inside directors and five prominent outside di-
rectors, four of whom were experienced chief executive officers
("CEOs") of comparable-sized companies and one a former dean of a
prominent business school.41 Van Gorkom, CEO and director of Trans
Union, hastily arranged a cash-out merger based on a price that Van
Gorkom himself grabbed out of the air, never bothering to read the
various crucial documents, and thereafter executed the agreement dur-
" The Francis fact pattern was not necessarily an unusual one; duty of care cases
often involve egregious neglect of office. See, e.g., Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504,
507 (1919) (director never attended a single directors' meeting nor in any matter at-
tempted to inform himself); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 640, 641, 645, 249
N.Y.S.2d 1, 4, 8 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (out-of-state directors did not attend meetings and
otherwise neglected their duties, and one director conceded that he did nothing as a
director, believing his position to be "honorary"); Neese v. Brown, 218 Tenn. 686, 689-
90, 405 S.W.2d 577, 579 (1964) (virtual abdication of directors' duty by allowing the
president to have one-man control).
31 Francis, 87 N.J. at 23, 432 A.2d at 818.
36 Id. at 20, 432 A.2d at 816.
37 Id. at 26-27, 432 A.2d at 819-20.
38 Id. at 21, 432 A.2d at 816-17.
39 Id. at 34, 432 A.2d at 823.
40 Trans Union has been widely noted, criticized, and explained. For instance, the
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law virtually dedicated a whole issue to the case. See
Moskin, Trans Union: A Nailed Board, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405 (1985); Prickett, An
Explanation of Trans Union to "Henny-Penny" and Her Friends, 10 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 451 (1985); Schwartz & Wiles, Trans Union: Neither "New" nor "Bad" Law, 10
DEL. J. CORP. L. 429 (1985); Comment, Mining the Safe Harbor? The Business
Judgment Rule After Trans Union, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 545 (1985).
41 Trans Union, 488 A.2d at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
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ing a social event for the opening of the Chicago Lyric Opera.42
The Delaware Supreme Court hinted at the motive behind Van
Gorkom's actions by noting that he was "then approaching 65 years of
age and mandatory retirement."4 It then held the directors personally
liable for, inter alia, a grossly negligent approval of the hastily-ar-
ranged cash-out merger without adequately informing themselves of the
terms or the financial bases of the merger.44
As evidenced by the majority's painstakingly detailed statement of
the facts,45 the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to go out of its way
to use this case as a vehicle to revitalize the dormant duty of care doc-
trine. Nevertheless, accepting the majority's version of the facts, Trans
Union does not represent an extension of duty of care liability but
rather a less forgiving application of it. Indeed, according to one com-
mentator, Trans Union "can be fitted. . . into the mainstream of busi-
ness judgment rule jurisprudence, with its emphasis not on the merits
of the decision made by the directors but on the process by which the
decision was made."
'46
Two other commentators, however, would cast Trans Union as a
conspicuous departure from mainstream business judgment rule juris-
prudence, arguing that:
[T]he court's decision may rest on a simple misunderstand-
ing of how the world works ....
. . .[T]he court failed to appreciate that courts are not
very good at evaluating a director's business acumen and dis-
ciplining his or her lapses ...
Another thing the court failed to appreciate is the need
to help directors be bold.
The [Trans Union] court's effort to [describe good deci-
sion making formally] was wasted. Bad decisions can be
made while observing all the prescribed formalities of [Trans
42 Id. at 865-869.
43 Id. at 865-66.
44 Id. at 881, 884.
41 The dissent even noted that "[tihe majority opinion reads like an advocate's
closing address to a hostile jury." Id. at 893 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
41 Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van
Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1, 4 (1985); cf. Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 40, at 442
("[There appears to be no reported decision prior to Trans Union which holds, solely
on the basis of the Board's decision-making process, that a third party merger is inva-
lid as the product of an uninformed business judgment. And to this extent Trans Union
breaks new ground."). Schwartz and Wiles also note, however, that if proper proce-
dures are followed so that the board is 'informed,' the court of chancery will ordinarily
defer to the directors' business judgment." Id. at 443.
250 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Union]; good decisions can be reached without them.
.[It] makes for an odd dichotomy [that the] product
of a decision gets a lot of respect, [but] the procedure behind
it doesn't.4
But much of the above-quoted criticism rings hollow. First, "how
the world works" cannot serve as a justification for judicial tolerance.
The way "it is" is not necessarily the way it should be. The court may
very well have "failed to appreciate," or failed to be blinded by, the fact
that business judgments are best left to those in business. But even a
cursory review of the history of duty of care jurisprudence shows that
courts have been extremely deferential to business judgments,48 and it
would be sensationalistic to argue that the Trans Union court signalled
the end of that deeply-rooted judicial sentiment. Indeed, the same court
appeared to have settled back into the deferential mode in three promi-
nent post-Trans Union cases.49 Moreover, "assuming . . .as true the
[majority's] recitation of the... facts..., the outcome of the case is
not so startling." 50
Second, the commentators' argument that good decisions can be
reached without the "formalities of [Trans Union]" ignores the empha-
sis on process, rather than on product. It may be the reasonable hope of
the court that a better informed process will lead to a greater number
of better informed decisions. It makes a great deal of sense that courts
focus solely on the process because the products are subject to innocent
pitfalls of human imperfection in judgment which no court is willing to
condemn. Thus, bad decisions reached through bad process will be con-
demned, while bad decisions reached despite good process will not.
Good decisions reached through bad process likewise will be frowned
upon, but the plaintiff will not be able to recover anything in these
cases because the bad process has not caused any damage.51 Further-
more, the process-product distinction is not an "odd dichotomy" at all.
It is a fundamental concept in American law.52
47 Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business
Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187, 1189-90 (1986).
4 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
' See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co. 493
A.2d 929 (Del. 1985). For a discussion of this retrenchment, see Henderson, Olson &
Hatch, Developments Inside the Corporate Boardroom: Functioning Without Insur-
ance or Contractual Protection Against Liability, 18-2 INST. ON SEC. REG. 207, 228-
250 (1986).
5o Manning, supra note 46, at 3.
5' The causation requirement was strongly stated by Judge Hand in Barnes v.
Andrews, 298 F. 614, 619-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
1 That concept is embodied in, most obviously, the due process clause, see U.S.
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Finally, the commentators' argument that courts should encourage
directors to be bold risk-takers requires further discussion;5" however,
in view of the post-Trans Union line of cases, it can no longer be said
that the Delaware Supreme Court does not respect the force of that
argument or that bold businessmen have not adapted well to the com-
mands of Trans Union.54 In sum, Trans Union is not, as many had
feared, a monster in corporate law jurisprudence.
In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., the Second
Circuit gave the critics of Trans Union further cause for concern. Han-
son Trust appeared to require that directors adhere to an even higher
standard of care, and the court seemed concerned more with the prod-
uct of the decision rather than the process behind it. In Hanson Trust,
the directors of a cash tender offer target company adopted several du-
bious "poison pill" tactics. The directors granted a "white knight"
company a seriously undervalued irrevocable lock-up option on "crown
jewel" assets;55 a $1.5 million engagement fee (a "hello fee"); a $9 mil-
lion breakup fee (a "goodbye fee"), later put into an escrow account for
the white knight company's appropriation; and a $6 million re-engage-
ment fee (a "hello again fee").56 The board, consisting of three inside
and nine independent directors,5 7 conformed much of its behavior to
what one commentator has called Trans Union's list of "do's and
don'ts."' 58 While the court phrased much of its analysis in terms of the
process of the board decision,59 it still was not satisfied, despite the fact
CONsT. amend. V; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, and in the corporate context, the
various proxy regulations, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77111, 78n, 79k, 80a-20, 80a-25
(1982 & Supp. III 1985) (attempting to assure informed participation by shareholders
in corporate decisionmaking); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 (1987) (same).
5 See infra notes 136-53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
5 This device was an irrevocable option granted to the white knight company to
purchase the most desirable segments of the target company's business, thereby making
the target company less desirable to the hostile tender offer. The target company op-
tioned away two such segments of the business at $350 million and $80 million. There
was evidence that the former segment had a value in the $420-$550 million range and
that the latter was worth approximately $90-110 million. Thus, the court concluded
that the "crown jewels" were undervalued by at least $70 million, and at most $230
million. See id. at 279-80 & n.10.
8 Id. at 269-70. These fees were demanded by the white knight so that it would
be compensated for offering its protective services whether or not a protective merger
with the white knight actually took place.
17 Id. at 267-68.
" Manning, supra note 46, at 3, 8-14 (giving a seven-page listing of Trans
Union's "do's and don'ts" in the appendix).
59 See, e.g., Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 274 ("[Wihere their 'methodologies and
procedures' are 'so restricted in scope, so shallow in execution, or otherwise so pro
forma or halfhearted as to constitute a pretext or a sham,' then inquiry into their acts is
not shielded by the business judgment rule.") (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d
1987]
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that the "actions of the [target company] board [did] not rise to that
level of gross negligence found in [Trans Union]."6
Despite the harsh-sounding judgment, Hanson Trust should not
have triggered legislative action to adopt a Delaware-type provision.
One key to the Hanson Trust ruling is the procedural posture of the
case: the plaintiffs were appealing the denial of their motion for a pre-
liminary injunction.61 This was not an appeal from a judgment on the
merits as in Trans Union. The Hanson Trust court was not faced with
the dilemma of imposing ruinous personal damages upon the defendant
directors for their breach of the duty of care. Moreover, injunctive ac-
tions are not within the scope of the Delaware liability-limiting provi-
sion. 2 Thus, even if Delaware law controlled this case, the outcome
would not have been different. What the outcome would be on adjudi-
cation on the merits under principles announced in Hanson Trust is a
question for another day. For purposes of this Comment, Hanson
Trust, as it now stands, cannot justify the enactment of a Delaware-
type provision.
In light of the preceding discussion it would appear alarmist to
cite the cases analyzed or the liability explosion to which they have
purportedly contributed as justifications for the adoption of liability-
limiting provisions. 63 There must be a more compelling reason. The
recent insurance crisis provided exactly that for the proponents of the
Delaware-type provision.
C. The Tail Wagging the Dog: Directorial Liability
Limitation and the Insurance Crisis
The pervasive insurance crisis of this decade has not failed to stir
up controversy in the boardrooms of corporate America. Corporations
recently have found themselves unable to obtain D&O insurance cover-
619, 634, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 929 (1979)).
60 Id. at 275.
61 Id. at 266.
62 Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporation Code only applies to "monetary
damages." See supra note 11.
6S See Black, Jr. & Sparks III, Analysis of the 1986 Amendments to the Dela-
ware Corporations Law, 3 Corp. Guide (P-H) 311 (July 29, 1986) (stating that direc-
tors' concerns "were heightened by highly publicized lawsuits involving potentially ru-
inous recoveries"); Sparks III, supra note 32, at 10, col. 2 ("perception [of] directors
... that the courts .. . were increasingly willing to impose potentially staggering
personal liability upon directors .. . as in the celebrated Trans Union case"); New
Delaware Statute Allows Limits on Director Liability and Modernizes Indemnification
Protection, A.B.A. Bus. L. UPDATE, July/Aug. 1986, at 1,1 ("principal problem...
is the legitimate concern of directors over their exposure to personal liability").
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age, a dubious form of protection in the first place,64 either because
premium hikes took on astronomical proportions or because policies
simply were not available.65 Although almost all would agree that the
general insurance crisis is a problem deeply rooted in our society, less
agreement exists regarding the causes of this crisis.66 Yet, the Delaware
legislature and others that have followed suit have chosen to place a
Band-Aid reform on a cancerous problem, ignoring the deleterious ef-
fects on the rights and expectations of shareholders of our corporations.
Drafters of the Delaware provision have cited the shrinking mar-
ket for D&O insurance as the "driving force behind the bill."67 The
perverse turn of events in the D&O insurance market has frequently
been heralded by the press.6 ' By one account, prior to 1985, D&O pre-
miums for large companies were often less than $200,000 for as much
as $100 million of coverage. But in less than a year, premiums rose in
some cases to $1 million for about half that coverage.6 9 A comparison
study showed that in September, 1984, D&O insurance was available
for losses not actually indemnified by the corporation, for a term of
three years, at a premium rate which rarely exceeded .25% of the pol-
icy limit. It was a buyer's market. 0 By contrast, in September 1986,
D&O insurance was available only for nonindemnifiable losses,
whether or not indemnified in fact, for a term of twelve months, at a
premium rate of 5% of the policy limit, with higher levels demanded in
higher-risk industries;7 ' indeed, it was a seller's market. Furthermore,
additional restrictions and exclusions, such as an exclusion for share-
See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
65 See supra note 6.
66 See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
67 Ostroff, Delaware Law Could Limit Director Liability, L.A. Daily J., June 23,
1986, at 3, col. 1 (quoting Gilchrist Sparks III, the drafter of the Delaware bill); see
also SYNoPsIs "ro DELAWARE S.B. No. 533, 133D GEN. ASSEMBLY (1986) [hereinafter
SYNOPSIS rO DEtL. S.B. No. 533] (analyzing legislative response to unavailability of
traditional D&O insurance policies); Black, Jr. & Sparks III, supra note 63, at 311
(raising concerns about personal liability of directors); Sparks III, supra note 32, at 10,
col. 2 (discussing unavailability of insurance); Letter from L. Black, Jr., A. Sparks III,
& J. Johnston of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, Del., to Clients, at 1
(May 7, 1986) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (same); Pro-
posed Amendments to Sections 102 and 145 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
[hereinafter Proposed Amendments] (undated memorandum given to the Delaware
Legislature) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (addressing the
unavailability of insurance).
68 See supra note 6.
66 See Hilder, supra note 6, at 21, col. 1. Not coincidentally, Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, was decided on January 29, 1985, opinion dated March 14, 1985, as
amended upon denial of rehearing.
70 Hinsey, supra note 6, 181-85.
71 Id. at 185-86.
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holder derivative suits, have been included in the policies.72 Thus, by
any measure, the change in the D&O insurance market has been a
violent one.
Still, through all the polemic finger-pointing that has characterized
the insurance debate in recent years, the cause of the insurance crisis
remains unclear.73 Some evidence does exist, however, that a good deal
of the insurance industry's woes were self-inflicted through competitive
underpricing and questionable management. 4 The legal system, there-
fore, is not necessarily the cause of the crisis, and, consequently, legal
72 Id. at 187.
73 For instance, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Economic Stabili-
zation of the Committee on Banking and Urban Affairs heard testimony that empirical
evidence does not support the insurance industry's claim that a major cause of the
insurance crisis is an increase in tort litigation. See The Liability Insurance Crisis:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 155-66 (1986) (testimony
of Ralph Nader, Center for the Study of Responsive Law) (noting that the number of
tort claims has risen by 9%, only 1% more than the increase in population and ac-
counted for in part by double-counting as cases are redocketed and consolidated); Na-
der Calls Lawsuit Crisis a Myth, A.B.A. LITIGATION NEWS, Winter 1987, at 1, 1
(recounting Nader's testimony). But see Lewin, supra note 6, at D1, cols. 3-4 (giving
data regarding rising number of cases and costs associated with litigation against
directors).
The immediate cause of the sharp premium increases and lack of cover-
age are losses that insurers suffered from competitive rate cutting of com-
mercial property-liability policies in the six years through 1984. The com-
panies had hoped to offset claims payments with income earned from
investing premium dollars.
But by 1984, claims and administrative expenses exceeded investment
income by $3.8 billion. The gap widened to $5.5 billion last year, even as
premiums jumped 21% to $142 billion, because of unusually heavy hurri-
cane damage. Even so, the industry expects to post net income of $1.7
billion because of tax credits and capital gains on stocks sold from invest-
ment portfolios.
Insurers acknowledge that many of their financial wounds are self-
inflicted . ...
Businesses Struggling to Adapt as Insurance Crisis Spreads, supra note
6, at 31, col. 2:
See also, Hilder, supra note 6, which provides:
The current market for D&O coverage, which . . . is "in total disar-
ray," is partly the result of forces that have driven up prices of other kinds
of business insurance since late last year. Rates for commercial policies
had been falling for six years. Insurers weren't charging enough to cover
claims, but they expected to make up the difference by investing premium
dollars until claims were paid.
That worked for a while, but rising claims and falling interest rates
made the gambit a loser.
Hilder, supra note 6, at 1, col. 6.
It may be noted in this connection that the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 granted
federal antitrust immunity to the insurance industry if the state where the insurance
company was doing business had regulations in place. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1982
& Supp. III 1985).
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reform will not necessarily resolve the insurance industry's problems.
D&O insurance is a relatively new form of insurance,75 the pro-
priety of which was questioned early in its existence.7 6 Professor
Bishop, responding to arguments that D&O insurance expenditures by
corporations constituted justifiable "compensation" of directors, stated:
[T]o argue from this premise that the corporation may there-
fore compensate its directors by purchasing insurance ...
requires the tacit assumption that any kind of "compensa-
tion" is necessarily consistent with public policy. . . .The
argument that the corporation should be able to purchase in-
surance as "compensation" therefore seems at best sophisti-
-cal. So long as the law imposes on directors duties of good
faith and due care, it should not permit them to evade those
duties through the device of insurance purchased by the
corporation.
7
Despite such criticisms, largely from academic circles, 8 "virtually all
public corporations today carry [D&O insurance] for their officials."
'7 9
The inherent circularity of this firmly entrenched corporate habit has
not gone unnoticed. One commentator remarked:
Conceptually, it would be far simpler and more direct if the
corporation just insured itself against loss due to the negli-
gent acts or omissions of its agents, rather than using the
circular procedure of insuring its agents and then suing them
for damages that only the insurance policy it purchased can
cover.
80
Clearly, serious conceptual questions arise as to whether D&O insur-
ance should exist in the first place.
If the insurance crisis is, in fact, the "driving force" behind the
enactment of the Delaware liability-eliminating provision, then that
78 See Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Direc-
tors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993, 2012 (1978).
76 See Bishop, supra note 3, at 1078 n.1, 1086-95; Bishop, New Cure for an Old
Ailment: Insurance Against Directors' and Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAW. 92, 103-
114 (1966). But see Johnston, supra note 75, at 2013 ("The public policy arguments
against the purchase by the corporation of D&O insurance are now largely moot in
view of the statutes in most jurisdictions specifically permitting the purchase of such
insurance at the expense of the corporation.").
77 Bishop, supra note 3, at 1091.
7'8 This criticism, however, does not come exclusively from academic circles. See
Farrell, If Directors Are Doing Their Job, They Don't Need Insurance, Bus. WK.,
Sept. 8, 1986, at 61.
79 Coffee, supra note 2, at 805.
80 Id.
19871
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seemingly minor provision would appear to be the "tail wagging the
dog," and an unpleasant mixed-breed of a dog at that. The Delaware
legislature's solution to the D&O insurance problem is an inappropri-
ate response to a powerful stimulus, a stimulus that often prompts im-
pulsive, tort law reform "bandwagon responses." The inappropriate-
ness of Delaware's solution is evident not only as a conceptual matter
but also as a practical one. For example, the insurance industry no
longer provides coverage for shareholder derivative suits,"' presumably
having been sensitized to the circularity of a corporation suing its own
officials to recover insurance proceeds for which it paid. Yet, in this
area in which the purported intent to lower insurance premiums has no
relevance, Delaware would still allow the director to escape liability.
Thus, citing the harsh conditions of the insurance market as a justifica-
tion for eliminating duty of care liability is unconvincing. Unfortu-
nately, the directors sitting in boardrooms have not agreed. In fact,
many have deserted the boardrooms in response to the unfavorable con-
ditions of the insurance market.
D. The Exodus of Directors from the Boardrooms
Fearing the potentially ruinous personal consequences of the re-
cent developments in duty of care jurisprudence and the insurance mar-
kets, 2 many directors across the country have foregone their modest
directorship fees83 and have abandoned their seats in the boardrooms.
Corporations, consequently, have found it increasingly difficult to as-
semble a competent, independent board of directors.84 When scrutinized
more closely, however, the recent highly-publicized cases do not consti-
tute adequate justification for mass hysteria.8 5 Furthermore, blaming
the unavailability or unaffordability of D&O insurance for mass defec-
tion is an argument based on a dubious entitlement.8 6 Hence, the direc-
tors may indeed be "crying wolf." Nonetheless, with the approval of
the Delaware legislature,87 D&O liability insurance almost has become
a business necessity.
88
The Delaware legislature was faced with the real problem of di-
81 See supra text accompanying note 72.
82 See supra text accompanying notes 30-32 and notes 67-72.
83 See supra note 8.
See SYNOPSIS TO DEL. S.B. No. 533, supra note 67; ALI DRAFT No. 6, supra
note 14, § 7.17 comment c; Baum, supra note 4, at 56; Black, Jr. & Sparks III, supra
note 63, at 311; Sparks III, supra note 32, at 10, col. 2.
88 See supra text accompanying notes 30-63.
86 See supra text accompanying notes 75-80.
87 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (g) (1983).
" See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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rector resignations or refusals to serve, regardless of how conceptually
unsatisfactory the purported causes of the problem appeared. Not sur-
prisingly, Delaware chose to act in a way that would "maintain [its]
leadership"89 in the area of incorporating businesses. While the legisla-
tive motivation to stem the tide of board membership depletion is un-
derstandable, one must question what effect liability-elimination may
have on responsible corporate governance.
The movement in the recent decades toward more independent
boards consisting of a healthy mix of outside directors as well as inside
directors has affected the corporate world immensely. 90 Observers have
remarked that a "majority of outside directors is now almost a necessity
for a public company."91 Recently, however, reports indicated that the
trend has reversed. 2 According to one study, the percentage of outside
directors on the boards of the largest 1,000 industrial companies has
dropped from 63.2% to 57.5% in 1986, the first decline since 1966
when the studies began.
9 3
These developments appear ominous, especially when cast against
the background of judicial enthusiasm for independent outside directors.
Courts, in fact, sometimes have extended a near presumption of legiti-
macy to board decisions in which a good number of outside directors
have participated." ' Thus, in Moran v. Household International,
Inc., 5 the Delaware Supreme Court stated that in applying the busi-
ness judgment rule to antitakeover defensive mechanisms, the directors'
proof is "materially enhanced . . . where a majority of the board
favoring the proposal consisted of outside independent directors
11 Proposed Amendments, supra note 67, at 1. See generally Note, Delaware's
Limit on Director Liability: How the Market for Incorporation Shapes Corporate Law,
10 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 665, 687-88 (1987) (discussing Delaware's quick re-
sponse to the directorship crisis in order to maintain its leading role in the incorpora-
tion of businesses).
90 See Baum, supra note 4, at 56; Sparks III, supra note 32, at 10, col. 1. For
recent debates regarding the role of independent boards, see Baysinger & Butler,
Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporation Law: The ALI's Project and the Inde-
pendent Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 557 (1984); Karmel, The Independent
Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 534 (1984); Ken-
nedy, supra note 2, at 633.
91 Henderson, Olson & Hatch, supra note 49, at 275; see also R. CLARK, supra
note 18, § 3.2.1; Baum, supra note 4, at 56 (discussing how "[clompanies are being
forced to employ professional recruiters to search for top flight executives" to become
board members).
92 See Baum, supra note 4, at 56.
93 Id. at 57.
"' Of course, no level of outside director involvement can offer blanket immunity.
See, e.g., Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 267-69 (nine out of twelve directors were outsid-
ers and unanimously approved the defensive measure); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868
(five out of ten directors were outsiders).
" 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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... ," Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in Panter v. Marshall Field
& Co.,97 stated that "[t]he presumption of good faith which the busi-
ness judgment rule affords is heightened when the majority of the board
consists of independent outside directors."9 8
Intuitively, the appeal of having a board partially composed of
outside directors is founded upon the assumption that independent per-
sons, whose welfare is not closely tied to the corporation, help create a
more conscientious board, one that is less susceptible to the temptations
of self-entrenchment and self-enrichment. The validity of this assump-
tion, however, and the appropriate role of the independent director in
general are the subject of debate.99
Presently, the most widely-recognized view of the board function is
the monitoring model.10 0 Within that model, a higher standard of dili-
gence in corporate management is applicable to inside directors because
of the "intimate knowledge of corporate affairs"' 01 that their positions
afford them. Outsiders, on the other hand, "should not attempt to run
the corporation or arbitrarily to substitute their judgment for that [of]
management.. . . '[A]ll that the monitoring function implies is a will-
ingness to be vigilant and questioning in the effort to determine what is
in the best interest of the corporation.' "l02
Conversely, while outsiders may have a lesser duty to manage,
they may have a heightened duty, in some circumstances, to monitor
those who in fact manage. In Hanson Trust, the Second Circuit stated
that "[i]n the context of a self-interested management proposing a de-
fensive [leveraged buyout], the independent directors have an important
" Id. at 1356.
17 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
98 Id. at 294.
"' See Baysinger & Butler, supra note 90, at 558.
0 This view is reflected in the modern statutory model of corporate governance
that the business affairs of the corporation shall be managed "under the direction of"
the board of directors, as opposed to managed "by" the board. See MODEL ACT, supra
note 1, § 8.01(b). For a discussion of this trend toward a monitoring board, see W.
CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 19, at 140 (stating that recent state statutes have
adopted the language "managed under the direction of' a board of directors, thus es-
chewing the requirement of "active involvement by the board in day-to-day affairs of
the corporation"); Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law, American Bar Association, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus.
LAW. 1591, 1606-07 (1978) ("[tjhe phrase 'managed under the direction of' was in-
serted ... to replace the phrase 'managed by' "); cf DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(1983) (stating "[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors").
101 Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 578
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
10' Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639, 652 (Iowa 1979) (quoting




duty to protect shareholder interests, as it would be unreasonable to
expect management . . . fully to represent the shareholders. 1 03 Thus,
there already is in place a very loose system of directorial governance,
one that takes into account the time and information constraints of
modern business and that allows wide variability in the level of involve-
ment of the independent directors.1 4 It is against this backdrop that the
Delaware legislature sought to alleviate the problem of "directors' con-
cerns about personal liability [that] were causing Delaware corpora-
tions to lose, or to be unable to attract, qualified men and women to
serve on their boards.'
10 5
Nevertheless, when adopting legislation that alters the dynamics of
corporate governance, merely reciting the monitoring ideal of board
composition and then uncritically adopting measures intended to ensure
full board membership is troubling, at best. First, it is unclear that
implantation of outside directors reliably generates ideally independent
corporate boards. After all, structural biases operating to suppress non-
conforming points of view can permeate the director selection process.
Professor Clark has opined that:
It is a notorious fact that in the overwhelming majority of
elections for directorships in public corporations the public
shareholders simply vote for whomever is proposed by the
corporation's official nominating committee. . . .[T]his com-
mittee of the board was often made up of directors who were
officers, or friends of the officers, and it was careful to nomi-
nate only candidates who were likely to be well disposed to
incumbent management. Nominees tended to be agreeable,
chummy persons, usually of the same social class as the in-
cumbents.. . . Today, it may be the case that the characteri-
zation is becoming less valid more generally, because more
nominating committees contain a majority of outside direc-
tors. But since most outside directors on these committees
were originally identified by officers, and since there is a
kind of social compact among most businessmen at the top-
officer and director level, substantial change in the intensity
and seriousness with which boards act as monitors may be
103 Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 277.
Io4 One commentator has summed it up this way: "[W]ith respect to many busi-
ness decisions, outside directors should be thought of not as major contributors to the
substantive content of decisions or as shapers of specifics, but rather as critical review-
ers with a power of rejection." Kennedy, supra note 2, at 635.
"I Black, Jr. & Sparks III, supra note 63, at 311.
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slow in coming."°
Second, the ideal of board independence may contribute to a re-
duction in the quality of the outside director's input. Not only has the
monitoring model required only a minimal level of involvement from
outside directors,' but it also has given incentive for some "profes-
sional directors" to serve on many boards,"' thereby further lowering
acceptable limits of outsider involvement. In an extreme case, a retired
Citibank executive lent his services to eighteen different boards, eleven
of them public.' Consequently, it is not surprising that "many corpo-
rate governance gurus [have questioned] whether professional directors
are stretched too thin to fulfill their board obligations."" 0 Such devel-
opments have highlighted the fact that the movement toward the inde-
pendent board has had the unfortunate side effect of placing a higher
premium on quantity of outside directors than on quality of those di-
rectors' participation."'
The Delaware-type liability-limiting provisions appear to exacer-
bate this trend. Although corporations having seriously depleted boards
may find their situation intolerable, eliminating directors' liability for
violations of the duty of care constitutes a questionable remedy-one
that fails to take into account all deleterious side effects."
2
Delaware's approach to the depletion problem is undesirable be-
cause it ironically eviscerates the very mechanism for ensuring the
quality of director services. Under the provision, directors no longer
need worry about whether they are serving on too many boards and
devoting too little time to each; they no longer need face consequences
of negligently missing crucial meetings; they no longer need fret about
informing themselves adequately before approving the sale of the com-
pany. Indeed, although Delaware's "open-door" policy may lead to
106 R. CLARK, supra note 18, § 3.2.1; see also Baum, supra note 4, at 56
("[T]oday there are a lot of so-called outside directors who are not all that independent:
They are close friends of the chief executive, or perhaps of the company's banker, law-
yer, or management consultant."); The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composi-
tion of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus.
LAw. 2083, 2092-94 (1978) (surveying various criticisms of boards today and sug-
gesting proposals for reform).
107 See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
108 See Baum, supra note 8, at 59.
100 Id.
110 Id.
"' Some have cited this unfortunate trend toward the ineffective participation of
directors in too many boards as presenting one reason that the D&O insurance crisis
may prove beneficial. They argue that the tighter insurance market could improve the
quality of corporate boards by forcing directors to serve on a smaller number of boards
and, thus, to participate more attentively. See Hilder, supra note 6, at 1, col. 6.
112 Possible alternative approaches will be discussed in Section III.
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boards that are constituted more fully, the seats may be occupied by
"rubber-stamp" members who add little or nothing to the management
of the corporation. Many argue, however, that natural market forces
will deter directorial misbehavior and that the duty of care, therefore, is
superfluous.113 Part II will address this argument through a discussion
of the debate surrounding the compensatory and deterrent functions of
the duty of care.
II. RATIONALES UNDERLYING THE DUTY OF CARE
A. The Compensation Function
It sometimes is stated that a breach of the director's duty of care
gives rise to a cause of action in tort." 4 Torts have been defined as "a
body of law which is directed toward the compensation of individuals,
rather than the public . . . . The law of torts . . . is concerned with
the allocation of losses arising out of human activities . . ... "" Hence,
at first glance, compensating injured shareholders appears to be a cen-
tral function of the duty of care. Some commentators, however, have
argued that traditional tort concepts do not lend themselves well to the
corporate context.11 Indeed, the ALI Corporate Governance Project,
for example, has abandoned the compensation rationale.117 The ALI
cites three main reasons for doing so: 1) the difficulty of victim identifi-
cation and damage estimation; 2) the unfairness of imposing potentially
tremendous financial burdens on "part-time participant[s] in the corpo-
ration's affairs"; and 3) the chilling effect on the incentive to serve as
directors.1"
Yet there is no reason why a court should not award damages in a
"1 See, e.g., R. POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 383 (3d ed. 1986) (argu-
ing that managers have strong incentive to manage firms well, because mismanagement
eventually leads to bankruptcy of the firm and to destruction of the managers' future
employment prospects, as a result of the competition of better managed rival firms);
Fischel & Bradley, supra note 2, at 262-63 (suggesting that mechanisms other than
liability rules create incentives for managers to fulfill obligations); Scott, supra note 28,
at 935-37 (stating that apart from shareholder legal actions, other pressures and incen-
tives bear on management's performance, such as competition in product and capital
markets, the managerial labor market, and executive incentive-compensation
arrangements).
11 See, e.g., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (allegation that
director failed to devote adequate attention to company's affairs states a cause of action
in tort).
"I" W. KEErON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
116 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 630.
11 ALI DRAFr No. 6, supra note 14, § 7.17 comment c.
I' Id.
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breach of duty action in which these three considerations are not insur-
mountable. Imagine, for example, a situation in which the inside man-
agement of a closely held corporation perpetrated a massive, well-con-
cealed fraud that forced the company into an unexpected bankruptcy
and scandal. That corporation's small number of shareholders awoke
one morning to find that their stocks were worthless. In the litigation
that ensued, evidence showed that the independent directors had been
grossly inattentive and, on the rare occasions when they did attend to
company matters, had acted as mere rubber stamps.
In this hypothetical, knotty problems of identifying and evaluating
losses are not insignificant. In addition, any chilling effect on the incen-
tive to serve as a director would be minimal, given the exaggerated
nature of the directors' breach of duty. At any rate, potential chilling
effects on those who fear liability for violations as outlandish as these
would represent positive, not negative, consequences of a damage
award. No one wants individuals capable of such neglect serving as
directors in the boardroom. Furthermore, the fact that the directors in
this hypothetical served only as part-time members should not excuse
their misconduct or limit their liability, particularly because their lia-
bility is based upon the very fact that their participation was substan-
tially part-time. The preceding hypothetical is intended to illustrate the
point that since duty of care jurisprudence always has proceeded, and
should continue to proceed, on a case-by-case basis,'19 in the rare in-
stances in which the problems associated with the compensation ration-
ale are not burdensome, the concern for compensating injured share-
holders should not be compromised.
In light of the preceding discussion, one certainly may ask why the
compensation rationale should be treated as a "second-class" rationale
in the first place. Professor Cox has argued that "there is no genuine
conflict between either compensation or deterrence in a good many
cases. .. "120 Professor Coffee, on the other hand, argues along much
the same line, as the ALI, stressing the circularity of modern mecha-
119 See, e.g., Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149, 1161 (D. Kan. 1974),
affd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975) (each case determined in view of its peculiar
circumstances); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 87, 188 A.2d
125, 130 (1963) (liability depends on circumstances and facts of particular case); Kutik
v. Taylor, 80 Misc. 2d 839, 841, 364 N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (duty of care
measured by the circumstances); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 423 Pa. 563,
581, 224 A.2d 634, 644 (1966) (negligence is a question of fact determined under all
circumstances). The case-by-case approach is also consistent with the trend toward a
more subjective standard of conduct required of directors, as seen in the common statu-
tory language calling for the care of "an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
... under similar circumstances." See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
120 Cox, supra note 27, at 776.
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nisms for recovery under the compensatory rationale, in which the cor-
poration recovers from itself for the mismanagement by one of its
agents.
12 1
Despite its uncomfortable "fit" with the realities of modern corpo-
rate structure, the compensation rationale should not be abandoned.
Just as the duty of care should continue to exist in an unobtrusive but
useful capacity, 12 2 the compensation rationale likewise should persist.
Professor Coffee concludes his analysis of the relationship between the
compensatory and deterrent rationales with a compromise position: that
of treating the compensatory rationale as a limitation on the deterrent
rationale.1 23 According to Professor Coffee, the deterrent rationale,
when taken to its logical extreme, can justify infinite litigation expendi-
tures for gains in deterrence that are not commensurate with the costs.
The compensation rationale, however, can temper such costs because,
under that theory, expenditures exceeding the sum lost could not be
justified as they would not produce a net recovery.
1 2'
But what of the instances when the deterrent rationale would lead
to a recovery less than that indicated by the compensation rationale
because, for instance, a court is overly worried about the chilling effects
deterrence would have on directors' willingness to serve? This Com-
ment agrees with the basic case-by-case balancing scheme adopted by
Professor Coffee. 2 However, the compensation rationale should oper-
ate independently to permit a higher recovery than the deterrent ration-
ale in the rare cases of extreme negligence in which the problems of
identifying victims and estimating damages are not insurmountable.
Having discussed the compensation rationale, the next section will turn
to its corollary, the deterrence rationale.
B. The Deterrence Function
Commentators have attacked the duty of care as a superfluous rule
of law that does nothing to improve corporate governance 12 but instead
121 Coffee, supra note 2, at 805 (The problem is that "the source of any recovery
is ultimately the officers' and directors' liability insurance policy . . . . Because the
premiums on these policies are typically paid by the corporations, these corporations
are simply funding their own recovery.").
12 Cf id. at 796. Professor Coffee states that "[riather than being a nullity inso-
far as its affect on financial liability is concerned, the duty of care has led a twilight
existence, marginally affecting the size of settlements . . . ." However, he also recog-
nizes the educational and socializing effects of the duty of care.
123 Id. at 807.
124 Id. at 807-808.
125 Id. at 808.
128 See, e.g., Fischel & Bradley, supra note 2, at 262-63; Scott, supra note 28, at
935-37.
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actually impedes it by striking terror into the hearts of competent per-
sons who otherwise are willing to provide their services as board mem-
bers. Moreover, others argue that the duty inhibits directors' en-
trepreneurial instincts, deterring them from taking justifiable business
risks. 2  But the duty of care has always served, and will continue to
serve, an important deterrent function-broadly as an "aspirational
statement"'12 and narrowly as a remedial tool when other market-
based deterrents have failed. Any statutory modification of the direc-
tors' duty of care must take these essential factors into account. This
Section will analyze, first, the market deterrents against directorial mis-
behavior; second, the aspirational role of the duty of care; and, finally,
the residual deterrent function of the duty of care.
As a preliminary matter, however, one should note that analysis of
the deterrent effects of the duty of care is clouded considerably by the
fact that disputes often are resolved by settlement. Professor Coffee re-
marked, with regard to a thesis of Professor Bishop: 2 9
Professor Bishop's thesis . . . ignores the central facts that
cases are most often resolved by settlement, not judicial deci-
sion, and that defendants have a particularly strong incentive
to settle derivative actions because, unlike settlement, an ad-
judication adverse to them will typically deprive them of eli-
gibility for indemnification. As a result, it is likely that cases
favorable to the plaintiff tend to be settled, whereas those in
which the defendant has the relative advantage tend to be
dismissed at a pretrial stage, often in recorded decisions. In
this settlement process, the parties necessarily bargain in the
shadow of the law .... 130
Interestingly, this observation supports either of two opposite conclu-
sions: that the duty of care should be preserved in light of its historical
role as a deterrent13 ' or that the duty should be limited in light of its
incentive for nuisance, or "strike," suits." 2 These conclusions, ostensi-
I2 See ALI DRAFT No. 6, supra note 14, § 7.17 reporter's note 2; Fischel &
Bradley, iupra note 2, at 270; Scott, supra note 28, at 936.
128 W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, JR., supra note 3, at 141.
129 Professor Bishop advanced the position that the number of cases holding direc-
tors liable for pure negligence, uncomplicated by self-dealing or bad faith, is extremely
small. See supra notes 3, 15 and accompanying text.
"I Coffee, supra note 2, at 796 (footnote omitted); see also R. CLARK, supra note
18, § 3.4.1, at 126 (noting that plaintiffs with strong cases nevertheless tend to settle).
11 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 797 ("[I]t is myopic to evaluate the law's
impact without taking into account the nonadversarial processes by which lawyers ad-
vise clients and thereby shape the behavior and consciousness of their clients.").
"I See, e.g., ALI DRAFT No. 6, supra note 14, § 7.17 comment c (noting that
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bly at odds with one another, can be harmonized. The fear of strike
suits should not precipitate the automatic abolition of due care liability,
nor should the need for deterrence subject courts to a flood of frivolous
litigation. A reasonable compromise can be found to meet the exigencies
of the 1980's.
Some of the arguments in favor of abolishing the duty of care have
come from the law and economics school of thought.1"3 Judge Posner
wrote:
The danger of mismanagement (negligence) is less serious
than the danger that the managers will not deal fairly with
the shareholders (disloyalty). Mismanagement. . . will lead
eventually to the bankruptcy of the firm . . . as a result of
the competition of better managed rivals. .... The managers
thus have a strong incentive to manage the firm well or, if
they are unable to manage it well themselves, to sell their
offices to those who can .... 134
Professor Scott, also arguing from an economic perspective, lists several
natural market forces that influence management's performance: com-
petition in the product, capital, and managerial labor markets; the de-
sire of directors to fulfill executive incentive compensation arrange-
ments; and the need of directors to protect their own reputations. 3 5
A related line of reasoning, the "entrepreneurial argument," has
had a powerful impact on duty of care jurisprudence and scholar-
ship. 3 6 Stated simply, this argument posits that "the duty of care may
deter directors and their corporations from taking business risks,
thereby chilling innovation and creative activities, which the law ought
to encourage. 1 37 This view recognizes the fact that "the number of
the proposed limitation on due care liability reduces the incentive to sue). "Strike" suits
are claims brought for their nuisance or settlement value, not necessarily for, and some-
times despite the total lack of, merit.
13 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 28, at 947 ("Nor am I encouraged by the total
absence of reference to and discussion of the considerable economic literature of the
theory and functioning of the firm.").
134 R. POSNER, supra note 113, at 383.
S5 See Scott, supra note 28, at 935-36; see also Fischel & Bradley, supra note 2,
at 274-76 (discussing effective governance mechanisms).
1'" The profound undercurrent of what this Comment labels the "entrepreneurial
argument" can be observed in the attenuated judicial distaste for meddling with busi-
ness judgments with the benefit of perfect hindsight, a sentiment that is formalized by
the business judgment rule. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text; see also
cases cited in ALI DRAFT No. 6, supra note 14, § 7.17 reporter's note 2 (indicating
that concern over liability may make corporate directors unduly risk-averse or discour-
age them from serving on boards at all).
Frankel, Corporate Directors' Duty of Care: The American Law Institute's
Project on Corporate Governance, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 705, 713 (1984); see also
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matters [a board of directors] might conceivably address is indefinitely
large ... [and that] there has to be some margin for error in those
judgments."138 The entrepreneurial argument is particularly persuasive
because it shares many of the basic premises of the capitalist system.
Nevertheless, this argument does not adequately justify the abandon-
ment of the duty of care. As discussed in Sections IA and B above,
courts traditionally have respected the entrepreneurial rationale, and
the recent, highly-publicized cases do not indicate that this deep-rooted
sentiment has vanished.
Even if one accepts the premises of both the entrepreneurial and
economic market-based arguments, it does not follow that the duty of
care should be abolished. Professor Coffee has responded to the market-
based arguments by asserting that the duty of care, as a normative stan-
dard, is beneficial because of its "educational and socializing effect." ' 9
He states that the "reductionist approach ignores the important educa-
tional and aspirational role that the law .. .[has] long played in our
society in setting standards."1 "
But this "social utility" argument in favor of keeping the duty of
care, by itself, is not totally convincing. It is not clear why this educa-
tional mission should be borne by the legal system, with its high trans-
action costs associated with litigation, especially in an area in which
law traditionally has shown great deference to the judgments of profes-
sionals in another field. Professor Coffee summarily states that if the
task of setting normative standards were left to business groups, the
result would be "an exercise in self-insurance . ..to eliminate any
possibility of liability or litigation."'' However, evidence to the con-
trary suggests that market forces generally do a good job of stifling such
inefficient, self-serving behavior.
142
Nevertheless, while the aspirational function is not, by itself, suffi-
cient justification for the existence of the duty of care, the importance of
the socializing effect of law should not be overlooked. Some argue that
ALI DRAFT No. 6, supra note 14, § 7.17 reporter's note 2 (sympathizing with argu-
ments against chilling effects on innovation); Fischel & Bradley, supra note 2, at 270
(same); Scott, supra note 28, at 946 (same).
138 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 633.
139 Coffee, supra note 2, at 796; see also W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, JR., supra note
3, at 141 (noting precatory and hortatory values).
140 Coffee, supra note 2, at 792-93. As a liability-setting standard, however, the
duty of care is not viewed by Professor Coffee as sound social policy because directors
are poor cost avoiders (except in the context of monitoring law compliance) and because
managers and directors are more risk-averse than shareholders desire. Id. at 801-802.
141 Id. at 798 (footnote omitted). This is an interesting comment in light of recent
enactments by various states of liability-limiting provisions.
142 See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 2, at 263-74.
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the laws of our society have always served this vital educational role.143
From this perspective, then, the aspirational characteristics of the duty
of care act like a "velvet glove," deterring potentially negligent actors
who are amenable to such gentle prodding.
The weakness of both the market-based system and the aspira-
tional scheme is that there are corporate managers who refuse to con-
form their behavior in response to either economic or social pressures.
The duty of care also can represent the "fist in the velvet glove" to
those unresponsive to ephemeral market forces or aspirational maxims.
The duty of care, then, should serve as 1) a minimal standard of care,
one that is even more tolerant than general market demands, and 2) a
remedial tool that courts may invoke in especially egregious, market-
fringe situations. An overview of duty of care jurisprudence suggests
that it traditionally has served these limited, but valuable, purposes.1
44
The duty of care as it is generally understood today requires only the
bare minimum of directorial diligence. 45 This fact should not be lost
amidst cries of draconian personal liability.
What the duty of care amounts to today is an obligation to "show
up""46 and inform oneself, 147 and not much else. Surely, these stan-
dards are less exacting than the demands of the market, which places a
premium on competence and expertise. Yet, a sizable number of cases
do exist in which market forces failed to influence the behavior of cor-
porate directors.'48 These cases highlight the existence of directors who
143 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 798 ("At least within our society ... the legal
profession has generally enjoyed a hegemony over this educational function of commu-
nicating standards to the relevant audience.").
144 See supra text accompanying notes 15-29.
145 Id.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 33-39 (discussing inactive or figurehead
directors).
147 See supra text accompanying notes 40-54 (discussing Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)).
141 The following are cases involving some form of neglect of duty by a director,
including abdication of duty, figurehead directors, inactive directors, and out-of-state
directors: Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504 (1918) (abdication); In re Happy Time
Fashions, Inc., 7 Bankr. 665 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (neglect of duty); Heit v. Bixby,
276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967) ("lackadaisical" discharge of duty); King v. Living-
ston Mfg. Co., 192 Ala. 269, 68 So. 897 (1915) (neglect); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.
2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961) (neglect); Rowen v. Le Mars Mut.
Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979) (neglect); Dinsmore v. Jacobson, 242 Mich.
192, 218 N.W. 700 (1927) (nonresident director); Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 202 Neb.
599, 277 N.W.2d 36 (1979) (rubber-stamping directors); Francis v. United Jersey
Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981) (inactive director); Brinkerhoff v. Bostwick, 88
N.Y. 52 (1882) (inattentive director); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 640, 249
N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (neglect); Van Schaick v. Aron, 170 Misc. 520, 10
N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (inattention); Mobridge Community Indus. v. Toure,
Ltd., 273 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1978) (neglect); Neese v. Brown, 218 Tenn. 686, 405
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are either oblivious to or unaffected by market or social pressures.
Could any amount of market pressure or any particular aspirational
maxim possibly have made Mrs. Pritchard "49 either perform her duties
or find a replacement? Similarly, why did market forces relied upon by
economic analysis commentators"'5 fail to deter Jerome Van Gorkom's
actions?"'1
Descriptions of these fringe groups are as varied as the particular
facts of the particular cases. Some groups of directors are not "repeat
players" and, therefore, have little to risk in terms of reputation or
other marketable assets.152 Others are "one-time players."1 '  Conse-
quently, the legal deterrence embodied within the duty of care contin-
ues to be essential in those situations in which market deterrents have
failed. To abandon the duty of care solely because market forces are
adequate to control most cases of directorial misbehavior would consti-
tute an action as hasty and unwise as the decisions made by Jerome
Van Gorkom.
Thus, the analytic templates against which Delaware's liability-
limiting provision, as well as other approaches to the directorship cri-
sis,M will be measured have been set. To summarize thus far: 1) the
duty of care has led a "twilight existence," deferring in most situations
to business judgment;' 55 2) recent highly-publicized cases do not signal
dramatic changes in duty of care jurisprudence;' 56 3) the insurance cri-
sis is a complex problem that should not be addressed by an inappro-
priate legislative response;' 57 4) the flight of directors is a serious prob-
lem that demands that legislatures respond with solutions placing
proper emphasis on the quality of director participation, and not just
on the quantity of directors; 58 5) the compensation rationale should be
preserved as a basis for recovery in the limited number of cases in
which the problems traditionally associated with compensating victims
S.W.2d 577 (1964) (inactive director).
149 She was the director involved in Francis, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814. See supra
text accompanying notes 33-39.
150 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
"' He was the central figure in Van Gorkom, discussed supra text accompanying
notes 40-54.
152 Jerome Van Gorkom, who was planning to retire, arguably could be included
in this category.
13 Fischel and Bradley concede that liability rules would be useful for such "one-
shot fraud" situations. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 2, at 270.
1'4 See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 19-28.
'5' See supra text accompanying notes 30-62.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 64-81.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 107-13.
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are not present;159 and 6) the duty of care serves as a basic deterrent
that should not be discarded merely because one is dazzled by the over-
all efficiency of market forces.16
III. THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
A. Indiana and Virginia:
Lowering the Standard of Care for Directors
Indiana and Virginia have drastically reduced the standard of care
required of directors.161 For example, a director in Indiana is no longer
liable for her breach of the duty of care'62 unless that "breach or fail-
ure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or recklessness.'
163
Virginia has progressed further in this "race for the bottom,"164 requir-
ing only that directors exercise "good faith business judgment of the
best interests of the corporation."'6 5 Unfortunately, both approaches
are seriously flawed: Indiana's, because the vagueness of the law ren-
ders it incapable of ameliorating the insurance and exodus problems; 6'
Virginia's, because the overbreadth of the law effectively abolishes the
duty of care and unwisely sacrifices the fundamental deterrent values
embodied in that duty.'
6 7
The Indiana duty of care statute is virtually identical to the corre-
sponding provision of the Model Act" 8 except for its liability provision.
The Model Act, as yet unresponsive to the recent insurance and liabil-
ity problems, 6 9 only shields directors from liability "if" they have com-
plied with the related duty of care subsections.17 0 Indiana, on the other
hand, shields directors from liability "unless" the director breached the
duty of care, and the breach is so blatant as to constitute willful mis-
'19 See supra text following note 125.
160 See supra text accompanying note 128 and notes 146-53.
161 See supra note 13.
162 See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(a) (West Supp. 1987) (requiring that the
director of a corporation discharge her duties in good faith, with prudence, and "in a
manner [she] reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation").
163 Id. at § 23-1-35-1(e) (emphasis added).
164 This well-known phrase was used to describe the trend toward "liberalizing"
state corporations'codes. "Liberal" corporations codes characteristically impose only the
bare minimum of legal restrictions and requirements, sometimes "water[ing] the rights
of shareholders vis-a-vis management down to a thin gruel" in the process. W. GARY &
M. EISENBERG, supra note 19, at 9.
165 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (1985) (emphasis added).
166 See supra notes 64-113 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 1.
169 The latest Model Code was promulgated in the spring of 1984.
170 MODEL AcT, supra note 1, § 8.30(d).
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conduct or recklessness. 71 Thus, the burden of proof with respect to
liability has shifted from the defendant director to show compliance
with the duty of care to the plaintiff to show noncompliance, plus will-
fulness or recklessness on the part of the director." 2
The question still remains, however, whether directors of Indiana
corporations really have reason to look forward to lower insurance pre-
miums and fully-staffed boards. The answer is negative, because as
Trans Union 7 3 shows, legislative exercises in semantics with respect to
levels of care are essentially meaningless and only provide courts with
room to apportion blame as they see fit. Prosser and Keeton explain the
nature of gross negligence (the standard utilized by the Trans Union
court), recklessness, and similar standards:
The prevailing [view] is that there are no "degrees" of care
or negligence, as a matter of law; there are only different
amounts of care, as a matter of fact. From this perspective,
"'gross" negligence is merely the same thing as ordinary neg-
ligence, "with the addition . of a vituperative epithet."
. . . [Willfulness, wantonness or recklessness] looks to
the actor's real or supposed state of mind . . what has been
called "quasi-intent."
. . . Since, however, it is almost never admitted, and
can be proved only by the conduct and the circumstances, an
objective standard must of necessity in practice be applied.
The "willful" requirement, therefore, breaks down and re-
ceives at best lip service, where it is clear from the facts that
the defendant, whatever his state of mind, has proceeded in
disregard of a high and excessive degree of danger, either
known to him or apparent to a reasonable person in his
position.
. . . As a result there is often no clear distinction at all
between such conduct and "gross" negligence, and the two
have tended to merge and take on the same meaning
174
Hence, had Trans Union occurred in Indiana, it might have been de-
171 IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 1987).
17 Virginia explicitly fixes the distribution of the burden of proof. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-690(D) (1985) ("A person alleging a violation of this section has the
burden of proving the violation.").
173 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), discussed supra notes 40-54
and accompanying text.
174 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 115, § 34, at 210-14 (footnotes omitted).
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cided in the same manner, and the problems about which directors
complain today might not have been avoided. The uncertainty of out-
come under a malleable standard such as "recklessness" renders the
legislative attempt to reduce the incentive to sue wishful guesswork, at
best.
Virginia's standard of care,17  on the other hand, does not suffer
from the kind of uncertainty that marks the Indiana provision. By re-
quiring only good faith 76 business judgment, Virginia's duty is in sub-
stantial accordance with Professor Scott's recommendation' 7 7 that the
duty of care be buried, leaving shareholders with only the duty of loy-
alty to keep a check on those who manage shareholders' investments.
Presumably, even in Virginia, inactivity or abdication of duty by a di-
rector will still give rise to liability, because directors must exercise
some "business judgment"'' x7 before they seek the shelter of the liability
shield.'7  Nevertheless, by abrogating the negligence-based standard of
care, Virginia has denied to its corporate shareholders the deterrent
value of the duty of care.180
The approaches adopted by Indiana and Virginia to lower the
standard of care required of directors fail to maintain the delicate bal-
ance between corporate stability and shareholders' rights. Their ap-
proaches will have uncertain or unhealthy ramifications on corporate
governance and may adversely affect shareholders' rights. In contrast,
Delaware-type liability-adjusting provisions represent a more sophisti-
175 See supra note 13.
'L6 A breach of "good faith" traditionally entails some intent to defraud or deceive.
See, e.g., Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 169, 142 A. 654, 659
(1928) ("The director['s] . . .judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud is ac-
cepted as final. The judgment of the directors of corporations enjoys the benefit of a
presumption that it was formed in good faith . .
177 See Scott, supra note 28.
178 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (1985). The director could conceivably argue
that it was her "good faith business judgment of the best interests of the corporation"
that she lend her reputation to the corporation by accepting a directorship position
without actively participating because of, for example, constraints of time or distance.
But see Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 513-14 (1919):
[The defendant director] was a man of such importance and reputation
that the use of his name must have contributed to securing the confidence
of the community and of depositors for the bank, and it would be a re-
proach to the law to permit his residence at a distance from the location of
the bank, a condition which existed from the time he first assumed the
office of director, to serve as an excuse for his utter abdication of his com-
mon-law responsibility for the conduct of its affairs and for the flagrant
violation of his oath of office when it resulted in loss to others.
179 See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(C) (1985) ("A director is not liable for any
action taken as a director, or any failure to take any action, if he performed the duties
of his office in compliance with this section.").
180 See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
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cated approach. The Delaware provision, however, engenders many of
the same problems faced by the Indiana and Virginia statutes.
B. Delaware's Approach: Enabling the Corporation to Limit
or Eliminate Liability for Breach of the Duty of Care
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporations Code. 1 is closely
tailored to exempt directors from negligence liability alone.'82 Because
it is an enabling statute, Section 102(b)(7) appears innocuous at first
glance. Under the statute, a majority of the original incorporators may
insert a liability-limiting clause into the certificate of incorporation
prior to any receipt of payment for its stocks,"83 or a majority of share-
holders may adopt such a provision thereafter.' Despite the demo-
cratic appeal of allowing the members of a corporation to decide for
themselves whether to limit directors' liability, the Delaware legislature
has not considered fully how completely the parties may avail them-
selves of the power granted them. It is now possible for shareholders to
completely exempt their directors from liability even for gross negli-
gence. In light of the important compensatory and deterrent functions
of the duty of care, however, a legislatively-prescribed minimum level
of liability below which the parties may not go is imperative.'85
The importance of the compensatory and deterrent functions of the
duty of care is highlighted in circumstances similar to those in Francis
v. United Jersey Bank.'86 No one can seriously deny that inactive, or
"figurehead," directors are a mockery of corporate governance. Yet,
Delaware's liability-limiting provision opens the floodgates for
"dummy directors" to infiltrate corporate boardrooms. As evidenced by
181 See supra note 11.
182 The drafters of the provision stated that "[charter provisions enacted under
[Section 102(b)(7)] can, at most, absolve directors of liability for negligence, including
gross negligence." Black, Jr. & Sparks III, supra note 63, at 312.
183 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101, 102(b)(7), 241 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
184 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1983); cf. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8364 (Purdon Supp. 1987):
(a) General Rule.-Whenever the bylaws of a corporation by a vote
of the shareholders or members so provide, a director of a business corpo-
ration. . . shall not be personally liable for monetary damages as such for
any action taken, or any failure to take any action, unless:
(1) the director has breached or failed to perform the duties of his
office under section 8363 (relating to standard of care and justifiable reli-
ance); and
(2) the breach or failure to perform constitutes self-dealing, willful
misconduct or recklessness.
18 See supra notes 114-53 and accompanying text.




the case law,"8 7 market-based deterrents are not enough to stamp out
Francis-type breaches of duty. Sadly, Delaware-type provisions allow
the law to turn its back on those shareholders and other interested par-
ties who suddenly find their investments frittered away by irresponsible
boardroom "ornaments."' 1
The Delaware provision leaves unaffected a director's liability for:
1) breach of the duty of loyalty; 2) acts or omissions not in good faith
or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law;
3) unlawful payment of dividends or unlawful stock purchases or re-
demptions; and 4) transactions involving improper personal benefit."8 9
This raises the possibility that, in many cases, plaintiffs will simply
recharacterize their claims and tailor them to fit one of the excepted
categories. A likely category is the duty of loyalty, because "there is
overlap between the elements of the two duties [of care and loyalty] and
it may well be in many cases that the facts will be malleable enough to
fit into one rubric as well as the other.""' It is unclear, however, how
many duty of care actions will be brought under a duty of loyalty the-
ory because the latter may represent a more difficult legal theory under
which to litigate.19' Professor Clark has stated that a closer analysis of
duty of care cases reveals that "directors were actually being sued...
for a violation of their fiduciary duty of loyalty,"' 2 and that the courts'
"twisted reasoning toward the conclusion that there was a violation of
the duty of care was simply a way of giving the plaintiff[] a break...
where equity seemed to require it."' 93 He suggested that in duty of
loyalty cases, proof of breach is more difficult and evidence harder to
obtain. 94 Thus, the Delaware provision probably will have the desired
effect of suppressing negligence-based litigation.
The Delaware provision also leaves injunctive remedies unaffected,
as it speaks solely of "monetary damages."' 95 Obviously, this is no com-
fort to those who already will have been injured by director negligence
because they were unable to stop the harmful transaction before its con-
197 See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
188 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
189 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i)-(iv) (1983 & Supp. 1986).
190 Brown & Davis, Indemnification of Directors and Officers and Limitations
on Director Liability, 18-2 INST. ON SEC. REG. 117, 152-53 (1986); see also Note,
supra note 89, at 668-69 ("As the duty of care wanes, the duty of loyalty waxes.").
191 See R. CLARK, supra note 18, § 3.4 (citing Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667
(Sup. Ct. 1940)).
192 Id. § 3.4 (emphasis deleted).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp. 1986); see also Black, Jr.
& Sparks III, supra note 63, at 312 (reiterating that the Delaware law addresses only
monetary damages).
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summation. In this respect, "[n]onfinancial penalties . . . have only
limited applications and thus cannot serve as an adequate substitute for
financial liability, in part because due care suits typically arise well
after the event."19 Injunctive remedies are inadequate for a more fun-
damental reason as well: their lack of deterrence value. Directors can
act without fear of individual liability, because all that the courts can
do is stop or rescind the offending transaction. Thus, having personally
lost nothing, the director is not deterred from trying a similar scheme
again.19 This problem especially is aggravated in situations in which
market deterrents do not strongly affect directorial behavior.19 "
The deterrent value of the duty of care is compromised even fur-
ther, or lost altogether, when a corporation elects totally to eliminate
liability. For that reason, the ALI recommends that "a charter amend-
ment should leave a minimum level of liability intact"; 99 otherwise the
duty of care would fail in its essential purpose. State legislatures, there-
fore, in order to preserve the fundamental deterrent value of the duty of
care, should not allow that duty to become optional.200
When confronted with charter provisions under Section 102(b)(7),
courts should scrutinize them intensely, especially if any of the follow-
ing factors are involved: 1) the liability provision was part of the origi-
nal certificate of incorporation; 2) the provision totally eliminates liabil-
ity; or 3) the challenged transaction affects the shareholders'
"ownership claims."
The first factor takes into account whether investors had adequate
notice of an exculpatory provision adopted prior to any public offer-
ing. 01 This notice concern, however, is limited by whether reasonable
means existed by which to give notice. One commentator suggests that
contracts of adhesion principles also would be implicated in such a
198 ALI DRAFT No. 6, supra note 14, § 7.17 reporter's note 2.
17 See Wiggins, Delaware's D&O Liability Law: A "Windfall" for Directors,
Legal Times, Aug. 18, 1986, at 11, col. 1 (stating that the potential for liability is a
necessary deterrent to negligence and bad faith).
19" See supra text accompanying notes 149-53.
19 ALI DRAFT No. 6, supra note 14, § 7.17 comment d(3).
200 The difficulty arises in ascertaining the optimal "minimal level" of liability.
This is discussed in connection with the ALI proposal. See infra notes 216-31 and
accompanying text.
201 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 826:
[Llittle confidence should be placed on limitations adopted in the original
certificate of incorporation to the extent that they immunized corporate
officials from any liability to shareholders for due-care violations. At this
point, traditional contract principles, such as those applicable to contracts
of adhesion, would become relevant, and a sophisticated court could use





The second factor involves public policy and statutory construction
issues. The Delaware legislature could have abolished the duty of care
much like Virginia, but it chose not to do so. The Delaware legislature
leaves the decision totally up to the shareholders and even then, only in
monetary damage cases. This perhaps illustrates the Delaware legisla-
ture's reluctance to totally abandon the duty of care and the important
deterrence function associated with it. Yet, total elimination of duty of
care liability would essentially render that doctrine and its goal of de-
terrence meaningless. Thus, a charter provision accomplishing this un-
desirable goal should not be given effect because it offends public pol-
icy 2°3 or equity principles.204
This argument is bolstered by showing the third factor, that "own-
ership claims," 205 were affected adversely. One commentator has sug-
gested that the differentiation between "enterprise issues" and "owner-
ship claim issues" helps explain duty of care jurisprudence. He asserts
that "ownership claim issues" receive more critical judicial attention
because they involve a drastic change in the shareholders' role as
"owner," potentially "sever[ing] a shareholder from his chosen invest-
ment. '202 Thus, in cases involving sale of the company or cessation of
the corporate entity, questionable directorial behavior should be judged
critically despite liability-eliminating provisions.
A valid charter provision, however, will most likely withstand such
attacks, thus leaving the litigant to challenge whether in fact the provi-
sion was adopted validly. The ALI suggests that "judicial review of
exculpatory charter amendments should look to the process by which
the amendments were adopted to determine if a fiduciary relationship
was abused. '207 Thus, judicial review is warranted when "misleading
or incomplete disclosure was made with respect to (a charter provi-
sion's] adoption or renewal. ' 208 Federal securities laws also are relevant
202 Id.
203 See ALI DRAFT No. 6, supra note 14, § 7.17 comment d(3) (discussing pub-
lic policy grounds for invalidating a charter amendment).
204 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 19, at 1636 ("[C]harter amend-
ments normally will be reviewable on the ground of fairness.").
205 See Manning, supra note 46, at 5 (distinguishing between "enterprise is-
sues"-normal business decisions by the board in the course of operations that eventu-
ally affect the value of stock-and "ownership claim" issues-unexpected board actions
which directly affect the continued existence of an owner's investment in a chosen
firm).
20 Id. at 5-6 ("[N]one of us reacts well to receipt of a letter saying, 'This will
inform you that I have just sold your house. Check is enclosed.' ").
207 ALI DRAFT No. 6, supra note 14, § 7.17 comment e.
208 Id.
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in this regard.20 9
A special problem arises when the litigant is a party operating
outside of the corporation. Third parties, such as a corporation's bond-
210 21* 212holders, insurance policy holders, ' creditors, or parties to a con-
tract,213 can bring duty of care litigation. The United States Supreme
Court broadly asserted that the "standard of fiduciary obligation is
designed for the protection of the entire community of interests in the
corporation-creditors as well as stockholders. ' 214 Representation of
third party interests is often found in cases involving a bankrupt corpo-
ration, as in Francis v. United Jersey Bank, in which the bankruptcy
trustees sued the directors for breaches of their duty of care. The Fran-
cis court held the directors liable for the losses of the clients of a bank-
rupt reinsurance brokerage firm. The court, focusing on the special na-
ture of the relationship between the parties, opined:
The hallmark of the reinsurance industry has been the un-
qualified trust and confidence reposed by ceding companies
and reinsurers in reinsurance brokers. Those companies en-
trust money to reinsurance intermediaries with the justifiable
expectation that the funds will be transmitted to the appro-
priate parties.
• ..That trust relationship [gives] rise to a fiduciary
duty to guard the funds with fidelity and good faith.21 '
It would be unreasonable to bind third parties to liability-limiting
provisions for several reasons. First, these parties have no say in the
adoption or maintenance of such provisions. Second, binding third par-
ties to such provisions would impede business efficiency by requiring
that potential creditors check for such a provision in the certificate of
incorporation of every customer with whom it intends to deal. Third,
the purpose of the Delaware provision, to attract directors into service,
would be irrelevant in the case of a bankrupt corporation, a situation
209 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (enabling the Securities and Exchange
Commission to regulate untrue statements or omissions).
210 See, e.g., Dinsmore v. Jacobson, 242 Mich. 192, 218 N.W. 700 (1928).
211 See, e.g., Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979);
Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 202 Neb. 599, 277 N.W.2d 36 (1979).
212 See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); In re Happy Time Fashions,
Inc., 7 Bankr. 665 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); Francis, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814; Neese
v. Brown, 218 Tenn. 686, 405 S.W.2d 577 (1964).
212 See, e.g., Mobridge Community Indus., Inc. v. Toure, Ltd., 273 N.W.2d 128
(S.D. 1978).
214 Pepper, 308 U.S. at 307.
25 Francis, 87 N.J. at 37-38, 432 A.2d at 825.
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most likely to involve third-party litigants, especially when the firm is
being liquidated. Further, in the bankruptcy scenario, one can argue
that the law should look less sympathetically upon directors of a bank-
rupt firm when the directors' misbehavior contributed to the company's
downfall.
In sum, section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporations Code is a
more sophisticated solution to the problem facing directors today; how-
ever, it remains unsatisfactory because it allows for the total elimina-
tion of duty of care liability, thus eliminating that duty's deterrent
value. Moreover, the Delaware provision may open a Pandora's box of
directorial misbehavior in situations in which market deterrents have
little effect because it is in precisely those situations that the duty of
care has been most useful and effective in acting as a deterrent. Other
states, therefore, should consider placing a minimum level of directorial
liability to ward off this possibility. This fine-tuning of liability levels
and the novel proposal of the ALI will be discussed next.
C. Liability Fixing and the ALl "Economic Benefits" Formula
The current version of the ALI proposal concerning the limitation
of damages for due care violations 216 ties liability to the "economic ben-
efits" received by the director. Unlike the Delaware law, the ALI ver-
sion does not allow the corporation to eliminate completely duty of care
liability; still, it has a similar defect in that no minimum level of liabil-
ity is prescribed explicitly.21
The first version of the ALI liability limiting provision set out
both a maximum and minimum amount of damages that could be as-
sessed for a breach of the duty of care;218 it also included an alternative
216 See supra note 14.
217 See ALI DRAFT No. 6, supra note 14, at § 7.17.
21" AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.06 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1982) provides in part:
d. Maximum Damages: Eligibility for Ceiling on Liability for Ordinary
Negligence: The ceiling on liability determined by the court under
§ 7.06(e) shall limit the maximum liability for monetary damages in re-
spect of a violation of a duty ... by a present or former ... director or
corporate fiduciary, who in each case can establish the following factors:
(i) the conduct or nonfeasance resulting in such defendant's liability
did not involve knowing misconduct, or recklessness, or otherwise surpass
the level of ordinary negligence;
(ii) the defendant did not improperly benefit from the transaction nor
act so as to subordinate the interests of the corporation to those of such
defendant. ...
e. Determination of Ceiling. The court shall select and fix a ceiling on the
liability for monetary damages of each individual defendant who qualifies
1987)
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formula tied to "gross compensation" for certain defendants.219 This
fixed approach, however, was problematic, because it was "necessarily
arbitrary and lack[ed] a conceptual foundation."22 Thus, the ALI re-
treated to a full recovery formula in a later draft.2 21 In the current
draft, the conceptual void has been filled by a contract rationale. Com-
mentary to the present version provides that "[b]ecause the relationship
between a director or officer and the corporation is consensual in na-
ture, the theory of contract damages affords an alternative rationale by
which to determine the damages for a violation of the duty of care, even
when the loss is foreseeable.
222
The present ALI version, consequently, appears well-suited to ac-
complish its proffered goals of fairness, a reduction of unduly risk-
averse behavior, a reduction in the cost of insurance, and the stabiliza-
tion of judicial implementation of the duty of care.223 Importantly, pre-
serving the deterrent function of the duty of care was not cited as a
rationale for the ALI formulation. The commentary does acknowledge
that some minimum level of liability should be left intact to serve the
"essential purpose" of the duty of care, but the ALI provision "does not
specify with precision what the minimal level of liability should be."
2 24
under 7.06(d) that is within the following applicable ranges:
(i) in the case of a director who, at the time of the events giving rise
to the action, was not otherwise an employee or officer of the corporation
in whose name the action is brought, . . . the ceiling shall not exceed (A)
$200,000, nor fall below (B) $50,000; and
(ii) in the case of any other defendant whose liability is based upon a
duty owed to the corporation as an employee or as a corporate fiduciary,
the range shall not exceed (A) the higher of (1) $200,000, or (2) twice
such defendant's gross compensation from the corporation . . . , nor fall
below (B) such defendant's gross compensation from the corporation for
the same year.. ' .
In determining the ceiling to impose, within the foregoing ranges, the
court may consider any factor that, . . bears on the responsibility of the
defendant for the loss in question ...
219 Id. at § 706(e).
220 Coffee, supra note 2, at 822.
221 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 7.16 (Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise specifically provided, a defendant who vio-
lates the standards of conduct set forth in Parts IV and V should be liable
for all losses to the corporation or its shareholders legally caused by the
violation, and for any other gains derived by him to the extent necessary to
make full restitution.
But see id. § 7.16 reporter's note 14 (noting an unapproved alternative formula that
would limit damages based on the defendant's compensation).
222 ALl DRAFT No. 6, supra note 14, § 7.17 comment d(2); see also Coffee,
supra note 2, at 823 (discussing various contract solutions to a duty of care violation).
223 ALI DRAFT No. 6, supra note 14, § 7.17 comment c.
224 Id. § 7.17 comment d(3).
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The commentary states that "[ilt seems reasonable to hold such officials
liable for the economic benefits received from the corporation for ser-
vices that they failed to provide adequately." 2 5
This Comment, however, argues that it would be unreasonable to
limit plaintiffs' recovery to the economic benefits received by the direc-
tor when a great disparity exists between those benefits and the eco-
nomic harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Indeed, if the director did not
receive any benefits, the plaintiffs would recover nothing. Unfortu-
nately for the claimant, inadequacy of recovery cannot be used as a
rationale for boosting damages under the ALI formula.22 Thus, the
ALI ceiling on recovery should give way when a director's egregious
conduct renders that recovery insignificant.22
A liability minimum also is needed to offer at least partial com-
pensation to injured shareholders and to deter the negligent behavior of
directors who receive nothing from the corporation but also give noth-
ing back. Unfortunately, setting a liability minimum in terms of dollars
is a frustrating task, and such an attempt would be conceptually unde-
sirable in any case because of its arbitrariness.228 Instead, a simple pro-
viso should be added at the end of Section 7.17(a) of the current ALI
proposal. This proviso would read, "provided that when damages
would equal zero under this rule, or would likewise be insignificant in
view of the extent of the director's breach of her duty and of the injury
caused thereby, positive or additional damages should be assessed [to
effectuate the essential purpose of Part IV, setting forth duty of care,
without offending the purpose of this liability-limiting rule]."
Through this modification, Section 7.17(a) should realize more
fully the provision's apparent intent to preserve the deterrent value of
the duty of care. This intent can be inferred by reading the carefully
drafted requirements, all of which must be met22 before a defendant
can take advantage of the provision's liability shield. Two of the re-
quirements, a lack of conscious disregard of one's duty (Section
7.17(a)(3)) and a lack of a sustained and unexcused pattern of inatten-
tion (Section 7.17(a)(4)), cover much of the market-fringe area dis-
cussed in Section IIB, in which market deterrence is ineffective and
duty of care deterrence is dominant.230 Minimum liability levels, how-
225 Id.
228 Id. § 7.17(a).
227 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 799 (arguing that the ceiling should be "porous"
in situations of knowing legal violations or gross recklessness).
228 See id. at 822.
229 See ALI DRAr No. 6, supra note 14, at § 7.17(a)(1)-(4).
220 Professor Coffee wrote, to the same effect, that the requirements "essentially
cover the limited number of decisions, such as Francis v. United Jersey Bank, in which
1987]
280 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ever, are still necessary in order not to foreclose the traditional duty of
care analysis.281 Therefore, the ALI "economic benefits" rule, with the
above modification, is best suited to resolve the "director crisis" af-
flicting today's corporations, because it preserves the fundamental val-
ues inherent in the duty of care.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has analyzed the major factors contributing to the
recent exodus of directors from the boardrooms of corporate America:
the alleged resurgence in duty of care liability and the perverse infla-
tion in the D&O insurance market. A close evaluation of the two fac-
tors revealed, however, that they do not provide adequate justification
for mass hysteria by directors. Many legislatures confronting the grave
problem of depleted corporate boards believed that a curtailment of al-
lowable damages in duty of care litigation was the best way to solve
this problem. Those legislatures, however, should have acted in a way
that preserved, not sacrificed, the compensation and deterrent values of
the duty of care. While these values are of less consequence in main-
stream corporate America, they are extremely important in situations
wherein market forces ordinarily influencing directorial behavior hold
little sway. 23 2 Moreover, the duty of care embodies a foundational de-
terrent value, a bare minimum standard of care above which market-
based standards may fluctuate.
In light of the foregoing discussion, this Comment concludes that
both the Indiana and Virginia approaches to the problem, i.e., lowering
the standard of conduct, are inappropriate because of either debilitating
uncertainty or draconian overbreadth. The Delaware provision, while
more sophisticated, carries with it the danger that the deterrent value
will be bargained away completely. The "economic benefits" formula
set forth by the ALI, with a modification suggested by this Comment
designed to avoid the problem inherent in Delaware's approach, is the
most appropriate vehicle with which to deal with directorship
problems. Not only does it to help alleviate those problems, but it also
operates without unduly diluting the compensatory and deterrent values
underlying the duty of care.
courts have actually imposed substantial liability." Coffee, supra note 2, at 820.
231 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
232 See supra text accompanying notes 136-60.
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